Map/D11/11.3

II · D11 · 11.3

Biological synthesis uplift

LLMs guiding pathogen design or acquisition.

Catastrophic · 5PlausibleMidRisk 10

Severity

5/5

Likelihood

2/5

In the hierarchy

  1. Part II: Societal & Human Concerns
  2. D11. Malicious Use & Weaponization
  3. 11.3 CBRN uplift

Virtues and principles to explore

Held as inquiry, not as a verdict.

  • Courage

    Hope

    Act without the comfort of certainty.

  • Stewardship

    Service

    Hold what is built in trust for those who will live with it.

  • Prudence

    Excellence

    Small, reversible steps before irreversible ones.

Starter questions

Written to probe curiosity and learning, not accusation.

  1. 01What would trustworthiness look like here: what we do, what we say, and the belief others form?
  2. 02What would it look like if we held “Biological synthesis uplift” with proportion rather than alarm?
  3. 03If we named this complication in advance, what small, reversible step would let us learn?
  4. 04How would we know we were getting this wrong? What would we observe, without blaming a person?

Also on this branch

Frameworks and sources

  • MIT AI Incident Trackerincidents
  • MITRE ATLASframework
  • International humanitarian law (IHL)framework

    The body of law that governs the conduct of armed conflict and the protection of people who are not fighting, which applies to AI used in or for conflict.

See also exemplar policies.

Writing and incidents

Open indexes first. Then, if you wish, ask Grok to search the live web for this concern — one request, cached for the rest of this session.

Fraud, cybercrime, and the weaponization of capable systems.