Map/D11/11.3

II · D11 · 11.3

Dual-use scientific research risks

Publications inadvertently enabling misuse.

Catastrophic · 5Widely observedNowRisk 20

Severity

5/5

Likelihood

4/5

In the hierarchy

  1. Part II: Societal & Human Concerns
  2. D11. Malicious Use & Weaponization
  3. 11.3 CBRN uplift

Virtues and principles to explore

Held as inquiry, not as a verdict.

  • Courage

    Hope

    Act without the comfort of certainty.

  • Stewardship

    Service

    Hold what is built in trust for those who will live with it.

  • Prudence

    Excellence

    Small, reversible steps before irreversible ones.

Starter questions

Written to probe curiosity and learning, not accusation.

  1. 01What would Prudence require of us here, before we proceed?
  2. 02What might we be missing if we treat “Dual-use scientific research risks” only as a technical problem?
  3. 03If a colleague raised this concern tomorrow, how would we receive it as inquiry rather than accusation?
  4. 04What capacity would we need — in people, in the institution, in the tools — to meet this well?

Also on this branch

Frameworks and sources

  • MIT AI Incident Trackerincidents
  • MITRE ATLASframework
  • International humanitarian law (IHL)framework

    The body of law that governs the conduct of armed conflict and the protection of people who are not fighting, which applies to AI used in or for conflict.

Writing and incidents

Open indexes first. Then, if you wish, ask Grok to search the live web for this concern — one request, cached for the rest of this session.

Fraud, cybercrime, and the weaponization of capable systems.