II · D11 · 11.3
Dual-use scientific research risks
Publications inadvertently enabling misuse.
Catastrophic · 5Widely observedNowRisk 20
Severity
5/5
Likelihood
4/5
In the hierarchy
- Part II: Societal & Human Concerns
- D11. Malicious Use & Weaponization
- 11.3 CBRN uplift
Virtues and principles to explore
Held as inquiry, not as a verdict.
Courage
Hope
Act without the comfort of certainty.
Stewardship
Service
Hold what is built in trust for those who will live with it.
Prudence
Excellence
Small, reversible steps before irreversible ones.
Starter questions
Written to probe curiosity and learning, not accusation.
- 01What would Prudence require of us here, before we proceed?
- 02What might we be missing if we treat “Dual-use scientific research risks” only as a technical problem?
- 03If a colleague raised this concern tomorrow, how would we receive it as inquiry rather than accusation?
- 04What capacity would we need — in people, in the institution, in the tools — to meet this well?
Also on this branch
Frameworks and sources
- MIT AI Incident Trackerincidents
- MITRE ATLASframework
- International humanitarian law (IHL)framework
The body of law that governs the conduct of armed conflict and the protection of people who are not fighting, which applies to AI used in or for conflict.
Writing and incidents
Open indexes first. Then, if you wish, ask Grok to search the live web for this concern — one request, cached for the rest of this session.
Fraud, cybercrime, and the weaponization of capable systems.