II · D11 · 11.3
DNA-synthesis-order screening evasion
AI-assisted design bypassing biosecurity filters.
Catastrophic · 5PlausibleMidRisk 10
Severity
5/5
Likelihood
2/5
In the hierarchy
- Part II: Societal & Human Concerns
- D11. Malicious Use & Weaponization
- 11.3 CBRN uplift
Virtues and principles to explore
Held as inquiry, not as a verdict.
Courage
Hope
Act without the comfort of certainty.
Stewardship
Service
Hold what is built in trust for those who will live with it.
Prudence
Excellence
Small, reversible steps before irreversible ones.
Starter questions
Written to probe curiosity and learning, not accusation.
- 01Who is served by addressing this, and who benefits if we leave it unnamed?
- 02Whose experience of DNA-synthesis-order screening evasion is not yet in the room — and how would we hear it?
- 03What is already being done about this, and by whom — and how would we find out without assuming?
- 04What conversation have we not yet had about this — and who needs to be in it?
Also on this branch
Frameworks and sources
- MIT AI Incident Trackerincidents
- MITRE ATLASframework
- International humanitarian law (IHL)framework
The body of law that governs the conduct of armed conflict and the protection of people who are not fighting, which applies to AI used in or for conflict.
Writing and incidents
Open indexes first. Then, if you wish, ask Grok to search the live web for this concern — one request, cached for the rest of this session.
Fraud, cybercrime, and the weaponization of capable systems.